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LIBERTY AND VIRTUE IN THE AMERICAN FOUNDING
Liberty and virtue are not a likely pair. At first sight they seem to be contraries, for 
liberty appears to mean living as you please and virtue to mean living not as you 
please but as you ought. It does not seem likely that a society dedicated to liberty 
could make much of virtue, nor that one resolved to have virtue could pride itself 
on liberty. Yet liberty and virtue also seem necessary to each other. A free people, 
with greater opportunity to misbehave than a people in shackles, needs the guidan-
ce of an inner force to replace the lack of external restraint. And virtue cannot come 
from within, or truly be virtue, unless it is voluntary and people are free to choose 
it. Americans are, and think themselves to be, a free people first of all. Whatever 
virtue they have, and however much, is a counterpoint to the theme of liberty. But 
how do they manage to make virtue and liberty harmonious?
Locke and the American Founding
The answer is: in their Founding. The American Founding is an historical period 
that runs from the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775 to the end of Geor-
ge Washington’s presidency in 1801. This is a period of 25 years punctuated by 
two great events at which two great documents were produced: the Declaration of 
Independence in 1776 and the Constitution in 1787. The United States of America 
has a written founding, of which the Declaration provides the principle and the Con-
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the political thought of John Locke, an Englishman who is America’s philosopher. 
To Locke, or to Locke’s contemporary audience, virtue seemed always to be in the 
company of religion; and, favored by this association, virtue seemed to have the 
upper hand over liberty. Locke’s task was to promote liberty, giving it priority over 
virtue, while not destroying virtue or denying religion. If he could accomplish this 
feat, his readers, first among them Americans, could frame a free constitution and 
found a free country in good conscience with the aid and comfort of God, or, in the 
less pious words of the Declaration, “nature’s god”.
For Locke, then, the harmonizing of liberty and virtue begins from the har-
monizing of liberty and religion. In the face of the apparent fact that the Christian 
religion tells men how to live, he must show, if he can, that it actually permits them 
to live in freedom. How does he proceed?
Locke gives two descriptions of the character of men in their fundamental 
relation to liberty. He says that they are the “workmanship” of God, that men are 
“his [God’s] property” and so belong to God; but he also says that “every man has 
a property in his own person.”1 These appear to be direct contraries because the 
“workmanship argument” (as it is called by Locke’s interpreters) would make man 
a slave of God,2 while the idea of property in one’s own person sets him free to 
do with himself what he wishes. Thus Locke says, in accordance with the former, 
that men have no right to commit suicide (“everyone is bound […] not to quit his 
Station wilfully”3), but in accordance with the latter, though saying nothing directly 
about a right of suicide, he pronounces that in the state of nature man is “absolute 
lord of his own person and possessions.”4 Yet Locke does not make a point of the 
contradiction between these two descriptions. It is rather as if he had forgotten 
what he said earlier or perhaps lost his train of thought. Yet Locke does not seem to 
be a woolly-minded fellow, and his reputation shows that both his friends and his 
enemies take him seriously. His political thought typically contains contradictions, 
of which this one is perhaps the most important, but he leaves the reader to do the 
work of establishing the contradictions and working out their implications. In this 
case and in others, Locke does not simply leave the contradiction as flat as I have 
reported it; he teases the reader with possible routes by which it might be harmo-
nized.5 But most of all, Locke lets the reader do his own harmonizing by allowing 
1 See: J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Ch. II 6, p. 27; also: Ch. I, p. 30, 52–54, 85–86; Ch. II, 
p. 56. 
2 See: Ar i s t o t l e, Politics 1254a, pp. 10–12: a slave is one who belongs wholly to his master.
3 J. Locke, op. cit., Ch. II, p. 6.
4 Ibidem, Ch. II, p. 123.
5 Locke deprecates the power of fathers over the children they beget; a father gets no right over his child 
by “the bare act of begetting.” (“That’s a joke, son,” as Senator Claghorn of Allen’s Alley used to say.) Children 
are not the property of fathers. One wonders, therefore, what the power of the Creator is over his creatures. Man 
being made in the image of his maker, he cannot but suppose he follows the will of his maker when he seeks 
his own self-preservation. Man has a self to preserve, and preserving it is in accordance with God’s will. Well, 
then: God cannot have property in the image He made of Himself any more than a parent can have property in 
a child. Even if man is the workmanship of God, he cannot be the property of God; and in fact he follows the 
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him to combine two things he wants to believe. Almost all of Locke’s readers wo-
uld have wanted to believe in the truth of Scripture, and many of them would have 
liked to think, or might be persuaded to think, that their belief is compatible with, 
or even entails, the notion of liberty that Locke sets forth.
The difference between belonging to God or to oneself is not a small one. The 
opening question of the Heidelberg Catechism, a Reformation statement of Calvi-
nist doctrine, says: “Q: What is your only comfort, in life and in death? A: That I be-
long – body and soul, in life and in death – not to myself but to my faithful Savior.” 
Locke is sometimes said to have been a Calvinist, and here is evidence of it; but 
the trouble is that he also shows evidence to the contrary. When he says that “every 
man has a property in his own person” he is starting the chapter on private property 
and opening his argument on the labor theory of value. Private property, it turns out, 
means property that belongs to human beings and not to God. When Locke speaks 
of charity from the rich to the poor, he does not make it a duty commanded by God, 
but a right of the starving poor to the “surplusage” of the rich.6 Here again he leaves 
a point to be noticed by those who can and want to notice, but he does not insist on 
it. How wise of him not to do so! The peace and prosperity of America depend on 
the peculiarly successful equivocation that Locke initiated between man’s looking 
up to God and his striking out on his own. What suffers somewhat is America’s 
reputation for philosophical study and awareness of its principles.7 “But a nation of 
philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings wished for 
by Plato.”8 This truth from the pen of Publius is a kind of guarantee that the harmo-
nization between religion and liberty drawn from Locke by Americans was not the 
reasoning that Locke had in mind for himself.
Let us summarize the problem and its solution as Locke saw them. The work-
manship argument makes man the work of God and thus establishes a divine right 
over man, who though made in His image remains the property of God, hence a sla-
ve. The self-ownership argument, by contrast, asserts that man is his own property, 
thus free and not a slave. The workmanship argument needs a notion of the soul to 
serve as the conduit from God to man and the window through which man can see 
God (indistinctly of course). But Locke hardly speaks of the “soul” in his work on 
will of God when he regards himself as his own property. This is harmonization, not in the interest of religion, 
that submits the Bible to an argument for human liberty. See: J. Locke, op. cit., Ch. II, p. 65, and the references 
in note 1 above.
6 Ibidem, Ch. I, p. 42. See also: T. L. Pang l e, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: the Moral Vision 
of the American Founders and of Locke, Chicago 1988, p. 144.
7 “The Americans have no philosophic school of their own, and they worry very little about all those that 
divide Europe; they hardly know their names.” A. de  Tocquev i l l e, Democracy in America, transl. H. C. Man -
s f i e l d  and D. Win th rop, Chicago 2000, Ch. II 1.3, p. 403. In extenuation of Americans, however, it should 
be said that most Locke scholars today, for all their study and awareness of Locke, and despite their own lack of 
Christian faith, believe credulously in the credulity of Locke as if he in his harmonizing of faith and reason were 
no more perceptive than the average American.
8 J. Locke, The Federalist, p. 49.
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political principles, the Two Treatises of Government9. For Locke, it seems, soul 
is the instrument of man’s enslavement to an entity above himself insufficiently 
concerned with man’s necessities, the necessities that require him to leave the state 
of nature and enter civil society. If man has a soul, then in Locke’s view it would 
follow that he is neither free nor virtuous (for a slave has no virtue since virtue re-
quires freedom). Instead of a soul, Locke supposes that man may have a “self,” for 
the strongest desire in man is the desire for self-preservation.10 And in the desire for 
preservation, the self is concerned with the body and seems limited by the wayward 
attractions of the bodily senses. The senses are passive and receptive rather than 
active, and they seem to lack any direction or integrity of their own. Every time 
we think we are attending to something we are actually merely being distracted 
by it, bombarded by impressions of sense. Just as the soul is questionable becau-
se it yearns for something divine invisible to us, so the self is dubious because it 
seems to be not a whole but a bundle of distractions. But Locke in effect declares 
the self to have the substance that previously was claimed for the soul, and in this 
way he combines divine right and non-divine right. He seems to say: you can have 
self-preservation without risking the salvation of your soul – or even instead of it. 
Whichever. It is up to you.
Locke left a twofold legacy to America in regard to virtue and liberty, of-
fering compatibility and substitution. Virtue and liberty could be compatible even 
if virtue is understood as obedience to religion, because man can be seen both as the 
workmanship of God and as owner of himself. This appealed to the many devout 
people and to their preachers who wanted to both believe in God and live in liberty. 
But also, as the self began quietly to substitute for the soul, religion came to be 
subordinated to liberty. At the time of the American Revolution several American 
colonies, turned into states, abolished the established Church in their domains. Fol-
lowing Locke, they could understand this measure as a requirement of true Chri-
stianity or an undermining of true Christianity.
I will leave to others the description of Christian virtue as it evolved to fit 
the requirements and enticements of Lockean liberty.11 It must be stressed that the 
American virtue I am going to discuss was not the only, the average, or the majority 
virtue at the time of the Founding. It was, however, the most typically American 
virtue because it was created by Americans at the time of the Founding. Later on, 
this virtue was called by Tocqueville “self-interest well understood” and attributed 
to Americans as theirs.12 In its private aspect we find it in Benjamin Franklin’s Au-
tobiography; the public virtue can be seen in The Federalist.
9 The two uses of the word in the Two Treatises refer to the soul of the legislature (Ch. II, p. 212) and 
to “mean souls” of slaves (Ch. II, p. 239).
10 J. Locke, op. cit., Ch. I, p. 86, 88; Ch. II, p. 56.
11 See especially: B. Sha in, The Myth of American Individualism: The Protestant Origins of American 
Political Thought, Princeton 1994.
12 A. de  Tocquev i l l e, op. cit., Ch. II 2.8, p. 502.
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Benjamin Franklin’s Bourgeois Virtue
“Bourgeois” is not a word that Benjamin Franklin used to describe virtue. If he had, 
it would have been one of the few times that “bourgeois” has been used as a term 
of praise.13 Bourgeois virtue was subjected to withering criticism from left and right 
throughout the nineteenth century, and the origin of it was a footnote in Jean-Jacqu-
es Rousseau’s Social Contract, published in 1762, just nine years before Franklin 
started writing his autobiography. In the footnote Rousseau distinguished a bour-
geois from a citizen – a bourgeois being a town-dweller in the Middle Ages who 
received his freedom from a royal charter, and a citizen being one who gave himself 
his own laws and who therefore had true, republican virtue.14 Whereas republican 
virtue is honest, straightforward and naïve (and thus requires much strict education), 
bourgeois virtue is based on self-interest. Self-interest, according to Rousseau, sees 
itself as single-minded, sober and sure, but in fact it is not. Self-interest is not one 
thing. If you think about it, you see that it is divided between what you yourself 
really want and what others want for you – and the latter tends to dominate. Thus, 
says Rousseau, you live for the sake of reputation with others rather than for self-
satisfaction. A society devoted to self-interest actually turns into its opposite. You 
end up living in a society characterized by hypocritical politeness and pretence as 
opposed to liberty and virtue.15 Now, although Franklin did not refer to Rousseau, 
his Autobiography constitutes a kind of answer to him. For Franklin thinks it is 
possible to be both self-interested and public-spirited.
Franklin’s Autobiography is a book designed to teach moral lessons. It is 
not merely an account of Franklin’s life, and as such would be quite inadequate. 
It is written with reports and stories, mixing narration and dialogue like Franklin’s 
favorite John Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress; and like that work it is also full of moral 
lessons, though much more worldly ones. 
Following John Locke, who besides his political and philosophical works 
wrote Some Thoughts Concerning Education, Franklin believed in liberty but did 
not leave to chance how liberty would be exercised. He saw that liberal society 
needed virtue and that for virtue it needed an education. One could not simply set 
men free and let them choose uninstructed. And while Locke argued for a private 
13 I once remarked to my late colleague Judith Shklar that Americans’ virtue is merely bourgeois virtue 
– to which she responded: “Is there any other kind?” I do not know whether she meant to praise the bourgeois or 
to denigrate virtue.
14 J.-J. Rous seau, On the Social Contract, Ch. I, p. 6.
15 Two subsequent haters of the bourgeoisie, Max Weber and D. H. Lawrence, were virulent critics of 
Franklin’s Autobiography. See M. Webe r, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, ed. S. Ka lbe rg, 
Los Angeles 2002 (German text originally published in 1904–1905), pp. 14–20; D. H. Lawrence, Studies in 
American Literature… For fine recent studies of the Autobiography, see R. Le rner, The Thinking Revolution-
ary; Principle and Practice in the New Republic, Ithaca 1987, pp. 41–59, and Revolutions Revisited; Two Faces 
of the Politics of Enlightenment, Chapel Hill 1994, pp. 3–18; S. Fo rde, Benjamin Franklin’s Autobiography and 
the Education of America, “American Political Science Review” 1992, No. 86, pp. 357–368.
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education by tutors for gentlemen, Franklin wanted a public education in public 
schools.16 A private citizen, he takes it upon himself – a free act of public spirited-
ness – to set himself up as an example, his book being addressed at first to his son 
but then, we see later, when Franklin includes two letters from friends praising what 
he had written in extravagant terms, intended for everyone (“think of bettering the 
whole race of men,” says one friend).17 A touch of vanity in Franklin, perhaps, to 
set himself as an example for mankind? But Franklin had anticipated this objection 
and had said at the beginning that he gives vanity “fair quarter wherever I meet with 
it,” as it is “often productive of good” to the possessors and to those around him in 
his sphere of action.18
With this apology that is not an apology but a lesson, Franklin goes back over 
his life, just as a printer goes back over a book looking for typographical errors. It 
is customary to speak of the sins of one’s past life, but Franklin calls them errata, 
finds five of them, and corrects them. He performs the office of St. Peter (or of God), 
judging his life and finding errors that were not so bad that they cannot be – not 
forgiven, but corrected. There is no display of vanity by Franklin, but also no show 
of humility. 
What sort of virtue does Franklin teach, then? He features sociability and 
public-spirited projects. He does not teach religion, though he does not oppose the 
teaching of religion. As a youth he wrote and printed a dissertation against religion, 
but luckily – or providentially – he did not suffer for it. He began to “suspect that 
this [necessitarian] doctrine tho’ it might be true, was not very useful.”19
Franklin had “some religious principles”; he “never doubted” (despite what 
he admitted about his youthful disbelief) the existence of God, and other essen-
tials.20 But he also had an objection to religion as such: that it is contentious and 
polemical. He noticed that from the first he was infected by books of “polemical 
divinity” in his father’s library that gave him a “disputatious turn,” a very bad habit 
making people often “very disagreeable in company.”21 
In short, religion tends to be unsociable. It sets people at odds and sends na-
tions to war. By contrast, human virtue is this-worldly, which means mundane; it is 
about how to live in this world with a view not to the next world but to this world. 
Virtue is not harsh; it is sociable and conversational. 
16 For Franklin’s educational writings see L. Smi th  Pang l e  and T. Pang l e, The Learning of Liberty: 
the Educational Ideas of the American Founders, Lawrence 1993, Ch. 4.
17 B. F r ank l i n, The Autobiography and Other Writings, ed. K. S i l ve rman, New York 1986, p. 84.
18 Ibidem, p. 4.
19 Ibidem, p. 63.
20 Ibidem, p. 89; the five essentials specified are the existence of God, God’s Providence, that man’s most 
acceptable service to God is doing good to man; that souls are immortal; that crime will be punished and virtue 
rewarded here or hereafter. Note public spirit sitting comfortably and inconspicuously in the center of the list.
21 Ibidem, p. 15.
97LIBERTY AND VIRTUE IN THE AMERICAN FOUNDING
Franklin says he learned how to converse by reading about Socrates, who, he 
observed, preferred to ask questions rather than contradict his interlocutors.22 But 
Franklin, going one better on Socrates, sought rather “information” than learning, 
and while hiding his own view and raising sly objections to another’s, he made 
philosophy compatible with, or even tantamount to, sociability. This modesty that 
is not really modesty is just the sort of politeness that Rousseau detested.
Franklin’s subtle modesty is on view in a passage where, soon after admitting 
that he would have been “a very bad poet,” (14) he presumes to correct the lines of 
the greatest poet of the age, Alexander Pope. Pope had written:
 
Immodest words admit of no defense,
For want of modesty is want of sense.
Franklin suggests that they would read better as:
Immodest Words admit but this Defense
That Want of Modesty is Want of Sense.
With this change modesty receives “some apology,” he says. In agreement 
with Socrates, Franklin implies that virtue is knowledge, and in disagreement with 
Socrates, that knowledge is about how to be sociable, and so virtue is sociability. 
Sociability is useful, like religion.
There are many more beauties in Franklin’s Autobiography that ought to be 
left to the reader to discover. Its theme is utility, and the constant way to utility is 
through the suppression of one’s ego, for that is the way to satisfy one’s ego. Utility 
means utility to oneself, but not only to oneself – also to the public and to mankind. 
In his exemplary book Franklin recounts a marvelous variety of useful projects in 
which he took the lead or provided the inspiration. It is as if he wanted to illustrate 
what Tocqueville was going to say about the art or science of association in Ameri-
ca.23 He could not have done all these things successfully, however, if he had done 
them out of crude, unadorned utility in the rule-bound manner of later utilitarians. 
When swimming, he said that he was “always aiming at the graceful & easy, as 
well as the Useful.”24 He himself was a man of style, and he wanted to give style to 
utility, or combine style with utility, lest life be made dull and crass.
The best part of style is not to attract attention. Franklin learned the impro-
priety of “presenting one’s self as the Proposer of any useful Project”; it is much 
better to keep out of sight. “The present little Sacrifice of your Vanity will afterwar-
22 Ibidem, pp. 18–19. And Socrates never embarrassed or exposed the ignorance of anyone while asking 
his questions? And was never put on trial and sentenced to death? Franklin, unlike Socrates, was able to embar-
rass foolish acquaintances without risking death; see the incident in which he used the “Socratic method” with 
Keimer, pp. 39–40.
23 A. de  Tocquev i l l e, op. cit., Ch. I 2.4; Ch. II 2.5–8.
24 B. F r ank l i n, op. cit., p. 53; see R. Le rne r, The Thinking Revolutionary, p. 43.
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ds be amply repaid” when people find out that the credit belongs to you.25 Yet three 
pages after saying this Franklin presents as his own “the bold and arduous Project 
of arriving at moral perfection.” He had intended to write a book on the Art of Vir-
tue, but instead he inserts only a couple of pages on twelve or thirteen virtues and 
precepts. He is no pompous Mr. Perfect, for these virtues are designed to improve 
him as well as others. They are formed on a method that seeks to prevent the usual 
fault of such a list that in focusing on one virtue a person tends to forget the other 
virtues. Franklin has a little book in which to record his faults, methodical fellow 
that he is. His list consists of bourgeois virtues to be sure, but also of citizen virtues 
such as justice and sincerity – thus spanning the distinction between bourgeois and 
citizen on which Rousseau insisted.
If we compare Franklin’s list to the eleven virtues that Aristotle discusses in 
his Ethics, we see that Franklin has omitted courage, ambition, generosity, magni-
ficence, magnanimity (Aristotle’s magnanimous man, possessed of all the virtues 
and aware of it, would not keep a little book in which to write down his faults), 
friendliness and wit. These are the virtues of nobility (together with friendliness 
and wit, virtues of sociability for its own sake rather than for utility), virtues that are 
out of the ordinary. To Aristotle’s list Franklin adds virtues that are instrumental, 
such as order and cleanliness, which are beneath Aristotle’s moral virtues. Franklin 
replaces Aristotle’s generosity with frugality, the bourgeois virtue par excellence. 
Why so?  He was a generous man, and if he was frugal it was so as to be generous. 
He was more than generous; he was a great man. But he does not “present himself” 
as such. His seventh virtue is sincerity, defined as “Use no hurtful deceit.” Hmm. Is 
harmless or well-intended deceit what we usually mean by “sincerity”?
The Autobiography is stock full of deceits that Franklin found not hurtful 
but useful.26 It stops at 1757, just when Franklin was about to become a great man, 
and entering the period of his life on which a biography would say the most. For 
Franklin’s purpose it stops just at the right moment, for he did not want to look 
back on his life as from above. Even the scientific experiments he records show 
the human side of science – the vanity of scientists.27 Franklin’s cure for the va-
nity of the great man is to be kind and humane by disguising one’s greatness. His 
book records what is today called the American Dream, a peculiar dream that can 
be realized. You make it real when you rise from poverty and obscurity by doing 
good to your fellow citizens. Franklin records the method for realizing the dream, 
which is to relax strict morality, not so much as to get ahead by fair means or foul, 
as with Machiavelli, but to get the approbation of other citizens, finally the public, 
who in general do not find strict morality attractive. Thus can a great man manage 
to survive among so many who are not great, and also benefit the community with 
many useful insights and inventions. But are these many useful benefits great be-
25 B. F r ank l i n, op. cit., p. 87.
26 R. Le rne r, op. cit., pp. 50–53.
27 B. F r ank l i n, op. cit., pp. 172–173.
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nefits? On the first page of The Federalist it is said that America is an experiment 
for mankind to see whether good government can be established by reflection and 
choice, meaning republican government, rather than by accident and force. Here 
America is a great country because it provides a great benefit to mankind. We need 
to see how greatness presents itself in republican government.
Montesquieu on Republican Virtue
It might seem that republican government is not hospitable to greatness. Great-
ness is rare and great men are few; but republican government puts power in the 
hands of many rather than few. Republican government is above all distinguished 
from monarchy, which is government by one person. Traditionally, it was thou-
ght that republics would have to be small, because only in a small country could 
the people run the government directly by meeting in a single popular assembly. 
The Anti-Federalists, who opposed the Constitution, accepted this “small-republic 
argument” while modifying it to allow a representative assembly elected by the 
people. So long as the terms of representatives were short and the turnover high, 
government would be close to the people, if not identical with the people. To sup-
port their modified version of traditional republicanism, the Anti-Federalists relied 
for intellectual authority on Montesquieu, who in his Spirit of the Laws described 
the Greek cities as the paradigm of republicanism. In order to live peacefully these 
cities had to be united, and for unity they needed to have one homogeneous people 
without ethnic or national divisions and a strict education to prevent factions from 
arising. Republics depend on virtue to stay united and to defend themselves against 
enemies, in contrast to monarchies that have their unity in the monarch and do not 
require virtue either from their subjects or, for that matter, in the monarch.
What is this republican virtue? Montesquieu defined it as being strict, stern, 
austere, and even ascetic. He compared the virtue of republican citizens to the love 
that monks have for their order. Just as monks subordinate their particular interests 
when living together, so do citizens for the general good of the republic.28 Virtue 
in this view is self-sacrifice, the very contrary of self-interest. After praising the 
republican virtue of the ancients, Montesquieu begins at this point a critique of it 
that the Anti-Federalists failed to notice. Self-sacrifice, Montesquieu shows, requi-
res an education that hardens citizens against enemies, producing martial virtue 
that he goes so far as to call “ferocity,” followed by a counter-education in music 
that softens these same bellicose citizens so that they can live with one another.29 
Montesquieu’s idea of republican virtue perfects it by contrast to the virtue spoken 
of in the classical sources, because Plato and Aristotle always left room for a virtue 
above anything that could be achieved in politics. Montesquieu, making a similar 
28 Mon te squ i eu, Spirit of the Laws, Ch. IV, p. 6; Ch. V, p. 2; Ch. XIV, p. 7.
29 Ibidem, Ch. IV, p. 8.
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point for a different end, shows through careful stages of his argument that republi-
can virtue cannot sustain itself, and in the end destroys itself by trying to renounce 
and repress human interests and passions.30 His solution is not to show the way to 
the higher virtue of philosophy, but rather to lead his readers, disillusioned with re-
publican virtue, toward a politics of liberty. In this new politics, no longer sought in 
the imagination but “found” in modern Britain, laws are mild, passions are loosed, 
interests are pursued, and commerce brings peace. The Anti-Federalists, wishing to 
follow Montesquieu but not quite taking his meaning, combined virtue and liberty 
by adding them together. They wanted both martial virtue and individual rights, and 
they did not fully appreciate the extent to which liberty was meant to replace virtue. 
They can be excused by the fact that Montesquieu did not make it clear either, and 
perhaps deliberately. A certain nostalgia for “ancient virtue” provides a prudent 
check on the selfish exploitation of commercial interests, on the one hand; and on 
the other, toleration of selfish passion takes the hard edge off righteous virtue. No 
matter that the boundary between virtue and liberty is not precisely defined.
Publius on Ambition
In The Federalist, however, a new outlook on “the extended republic” as opposed to 
the small republic permits a new republican virtue, one that can accommodate gre-
atness. Ambition is the focus of this new republicanism, and ambition leads to a new 
conception of responsibility. In one of many famous phrases in The Federalist, its 
pseudonymous author Publius says: “Ambition must be made to counteract ambi-
tion.”31 The context is a defense of the new form of separation of powers in the Ame-
rican Constitution, but the words might be quoted outside the context to apply to the 
whole society over which the Constitution will preside. Thus abstracted, we have 
a new principle connecting virtue to liberty. Franklin’s Autobiography was all about 
ambition, but he left it off his list of virtues because he wanted ambitious people to 
defer to the doubt and envy of society, and feared appearing too demanding himself 
of his fellow citizens’ approbation. Publius, one could say, returns to Aristotle’s 
promotion of ambition. Aristotle had noticed that people are sometimes blamed for 
too much, sometimes for too little ambition, as if there were an inconspicuous mean 
defining the right amount of ambition, and the right degree of love of honor; so he 
proposed that this hitherto nameless quality be counted as a virtue.32
Publius differs from Aristotle, however, in connecting ambition to interest 
rather than calling it a virtue. Just after saying that ambition must be made to co-
unteract ambition, he adds that “the interest of the man must be connected to the 
constitutional rights” of the office, as if ambition were in one’s interest. But is it in 
30 The stages are summarized in my book, Taming the Prince, Baltimore 1993, pp. 225–228.
31 Federalist, p. 51.
32 A r i s t o t l e, Nicomachean Ethics, 1125b1–25.
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your interest to seek and accept public office? Many ambitious people decide not 
to run, as we know today; and there are theorists of “rational choice” who aver that 
following your own ambition is less rational than foregoing the honor yourself and 
taking a free ride on someone else’s ambition. It does seem that ambition requires 
an expenditure of energy that might distinguish it from self-interest in its ordinary, 
less demanding forms, such as self-interest in a higher wage. In connecting ambi-
tion to interest, Publius shares Franklin’s deference to popular, republican distrust 
of that quality (which he does not name a virtue); but in referring to ambition by 
name he goes beyond Franklin too. He seems to want to teach Americans that out-
standing men of ambition are not so far from ordinary men as traditional republican 
suspicion supposes. Here is an example of what Tocqueville called the American 
doctrine of “self-interest well understood.” Tocqueville remarked that in promoting 
that doctrine, Americans “would rather do honor to their philosophy than to them-
selves.”33 But in naming ambition, Publius goes a certain distance toward honoring 
it, because he implies that it deserves to be singled out and provided for.
Let us recall that Publius mentions ambition while making a defense of the 
separation of powers. Ambition is asserted to be in the interest of the ambitious man, 
and his interest is connected to the constitutional rights of the office. The Federalist 
is renowned for the realism of its analysis, and especially for the famous argument 
in Federalist 10 regarding “clashing interests.” But the remedy proposed there is the 
extended republic, as opposed to a small, homogeneous democracy that allows one 
majority interest to dominate and oppress the country. This means that the play of 
interests is determined by the form of government. The interest of a faction differs in 
the two contexts: in the small republic it seeks to dominate and lord it over others, 
in the large, to conciliate and combine. These are two very different behaviors. An 
outside observer might want to call both of them self-interested, but if you were ac-
tually living in these two republics, you would say in the first that not to dominate is 
against your interest, and in the second that domination is against your interest. The 
universality of self-interest, it seems, is too weak to specify how one should live. 
We also need to know what the political regime makes our interest be. As a work of 
political science The Federalist could have been a dull tract of public law, for in out-
line all it does is to explain the various parts and clauses of a formal document. Yet 
in saying why the Constitution was written as it was, Publius shows how he expects 
its offices to work. The realistic analysis enlivens, but also emerges from, the formal 
structure of the new proposed government.
In Federalist 10 Publius warns against not only interests but also passions – 
against the “propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities … [over] the most 
frivolous and fanciful distinctions.” This might make one suppose that interests are 
solid and substantial while passions are the contrary. In the eighteenth century it was 
common, as Albert Hirschman has shown, for philosophers and publicists to rely on 
solid interests to soothe excited passions. Hirschman begins his analysis from this 
33 A. de  Tocquev i l l e, op. cit., Ch. II 2.8, p. 502.
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leading quotation of Montesquieu: “Happily men are in a situation such that, tho-
ugh their passions inspire in them the thought of being wicked, they nevertheless 
have an interest in not being so.” 34 But Montesquieu, sly fellow that he was, noted 
that passions might also inspire virtue, particularly the martial virtue characteristic 
of republics. This was the republican “ferocity” we have seen. He therefore took 
care in his book The Spirit of the Laws gradually to replace martial republican vir-
tue with modern commercial self-interest. This is what Peter Berkowitz has nicely 
called “the healthy liberal impulse to economize on virtue.”35
The Federalist goes along with the impulse for a considerable distance, as 
Publius expects the American republic to be devoted to commerce rather than de-
fensive or offensive war. But virtue will not be made obsolete. When discussing the 
House of Representatives, Publius declares that the aim of every political constitu-
tion is first to get rulers who discern and have the “virtue to pursue” the common 
good, and second to make precautions for “keeping them virtuous.”36 The virtue 
in question can only be public spirit or ambition. You might think that a virtuous 
person does not have to be kept virtuous, that virtue means being virtuous without 
external compulsion; but while this may be true of a few rare souls, it is too much 
to ask of the good people that voters can ordinarily hope to find, and above all with 
respect to the virtue of ambition. Ambitious men, we have seen, need to be counte-
racted by other ambitious men, but still perhaps as much to bring out their virtue as 
to prevent them from doing wrong.
When we come to the executive branch, Publius expands on the meaning 
of ambition, for the new American republic is not to have for its executive a com-
mittee chosen by the states, as in the Articles of Confederation, but a single person 
elected directly by the people. The U.S. Constitution establishes the first republic 
with a strong executive, and this office calls for a certain kind of person that is des-
cribed in some detail. Publius goes so far as to deny directly “the maxim of repub-
lican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than 
of a single man” – at least in regard to the emergencies that executive power must 
deal with.37 But this advantage of one-man rule does not arise from superior virtue 
in him. The executive is held to be on the same level as ambitious men in the other 
branches, and though he might have “the stern virtue [that] is the growth of few 
soils” – like George Washington – it should be assumed that his virtue will not be 
so exalted that he does not have to be “kept virtuous.”38 Accordingly, Publius orga-
nizes his account of the executive around a quality that has become very American, 
that most Americans today would consider a virtue – energy. “Energy in the exe-
34 Monte squ i eu, op. cit., Ch. XXI, p. 20; A. O. H i r s chman, The Passions and the Interests, Princeton 
1977. For my comments, see: H. C. Mans f i e ld, Self-Interest Rightly Understood, “Political Theory” 1995, 
No. 123, pp. 48–66.
35 P. Be rkowi t z, Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism, Princeton 1999, p. 33.
36 Federalist, p. 57.
37 Ibidem, p. 70.
38 Ibidem, p. 73.
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cutive is a leading character in the definition of good government.” Again we see 
that the office calls for a certain character in the office-holder. Energy is a morally 
neutral term that comes from physics, and in the Federalist it is paired with its co-
unterpart, stability. Any government, says Publius, needs both energy and stability, 
and the Framers had to make a special effort to combine them with the republican 
form, which in its traditional understanding had rarely achieved either.39 Energy 
is something like ambition, except that ambition is ambivalent (you can have too 
much or too little, implying a mean that is the right amount and therefore a virtue) 
while energy is neutral and may be used for virtue or vice. Yet Publius uses the 
word as if energy were a virtue or led to virtue. One could say that, for him, energy 
is understated virtue. To be a good executive you need to call on your own capacity 
for energy, and those who find themselves to be energetic will be the best for the 
job. The U.S. Constitution as a whole works through “job-based” virtues required 
for its various acting – or better to say, counteracting – roles. It is not that nothing 
gets done, for though the government sometimes comes to a halt, the Constitution 
is not designed, as is sometimes said, for inaction or gridlock. The executive power 
is always ready to act in an emergency. And the supposed inaction of American 
government is better described as action against a backdrop of counteraction by the 
two other branches of government.
What are the characteristics of energy that make for a good president? Spea-
king of the office, Publius says that the executive needs to have unity: it must be one 
person rather than a committee. The reasons are that one person can act in emergen-
cies without dissension and that one person is more visible, hence more accountable, 
than a committee. One could object that a committee could be unanimous and that 
one person might be of several minds and indecisive. Very true, and this shows that 
the office requires a person who is decisive in emergencies, not merely one person 
of no particular character. One could go further and say that “decisive” is also not 
enough, because the executive must decide well. At this point energy stops being 
neutral and becomes a virtue.
The next characteristic of energy is duration. “Duration” refers in the first pla-
ce to time in office, the president having a four-year term that in the original Consti-
tution could be extended indefinitely. Like unity, however, duration refers also to the 
character of the office-holder, to the fact that he will not be a pushover but will have 
“personal firmness.”40 He will have this because, having a long term, he may as well 
have it. Publius pronounces a “general principle of human nature” that a man will be 
“interested in whatever he possesses in proportion to the […] firmness of the tenure 
by which he holds it.” A firm tenure does not merely call for, but makes a firm man. 
The Constitution does not say of the executive: only firm men need apply! It works 
through interest, using interest to produce virtue. Or would one again object that 
personal firmness is not necessarily a virtue because a person of this character might 
39 Ibidem, p. 37.
40 Ibidem, p. 71.
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be a stubborn fool? The answer is that the executive will be enabled by the duration 
(and hence the independence) of his office to oppose the legislature, which, being 
closer to the people, is more likely to reflect “every sudden passion” or “every tran-
sient impulse” that may take hold of the people. The executive’s personal firmness 
will prevent him from feeling or showing a “service pliancy […] to a prevailing 
current,” thus raising firmness above stubbornness. Here, too, energy shades into 
stability. A firm executive will have a stable administration.
We recall Franklin’s list of virtues for a free society, which might be summed 
up as sociability under an aura of modesty. One of the virtues was “resolution,” 
but this meant resolving to perform what one ought, not resolution against others. 
There is nothing like “personal firmness” in the list, and if you wanted to be critical, 
you could say it had an odor of “servile pliancy” to the opinion of society. Franklin 
gives us the virtues enabling us to live in a free society; Publius gives us the virtues 
for governing it. Both sets of virtues are characterized by modest understatement in 
which sternness and imperturbability in bad and in good fortune are omitted or not 
stressed. Nothing heroic is set forth, much less required. But Publius sees, as against 
previous republican theorists, that in a popular government the virtue of standing up 
to the people is the most needful. Perhaps, too – and contrary to Franklin – personal 
firmness against the pressure of public opinion is the most useful social virtue. And 
you might get from the phrase “servile pliancy” the contrary of personal firmness, the 
idea that there is something noble about it as well. Thus, when personal firmness is 
counted a political virtue, it might through imitation and emulation become a social 
one too.41
There is a further stage in the meaning of energy, going beyond personal 
firmness, which arises when Publius takes up the lack of a constitutional limit on 
the president’s eligibility for re-election. Interpreting this deliberate omission, Pub-
lius extends his discussion of duration from being firm to having long-range plans 
and goals – in Publius’s always elegant prose, undertaking “extensive and arduous 
enterprises.” And here Publius speaks the famous phrase in which Alexander Hamil-
ton can be clearly seen behind the mask: “love of fame [is] the ruling passion of the 
noblest minds.”42 The noblest minds are distinct from “the generality of men,” and as 
such not only must they be included but they must not be excluded – as if the noblest 
minds had a right to a place in republican government. Not to allow them a second or 
third term would be excluding them! For such a man would foresee that he could not 
finish anything great that he might begin. Publius does not refer to great men here, 
and the only man called “great” in The Federalist is the philosopher Montesquieu.43 
But the American people, perhaps prompted by professors, have taken up the game 
of listing the “great presidents,” and their presidents are by no means indifferent to 
41 That George Washington understood this well is the point of Richard Brookh i s e r ’s  fine book, 
Founding Father. Rediscovering George Washington, New York 1996.
42 Federalist, p. 72.
43 By A. Hamilton, in: Federalist, p. 9.
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“how they will go down in history,” which is our subdued way of referring to the 
love of fame. It is quite remarkable that America, a country so proud of its democra-
cy, should be so open to greatness. Of course it democratizes greatness, so that pro-
fessional athletes, for instance, become “sports heroes” and are awarded a place in 
some Hall of Fame. But it is no wonder that when democracy recognizes greatness 
it democratizes greatness. What is impressive is a democracy that, contrary to what 
might be gathered from Benjamin Franklin’s Autobiography, is willing to recognize 
greatness (even if they often mistake it). I believe that The Federalist and the form 
of government it defends have something to do with this fact. When Americans 
want to honor greatness they surely qualify their attachment to strict democratic 
equality, but they do not have to leave the ambit of their republicanism. Thus they 
do not have to fall victim to a Napoleon.
Necessary to say – and how I wish it were needless to say – our American po-
litical science today is almost completely at a loss to appreciate the subtle interplay 
of interest and virtue in The Federalist. The reason is that it cannot explain ambition 
or public spirit and only thinks of reducing them to interest, desire for power, or 
aggression. But it is one thing to economize on virtue and quite another to replace 
it with economics.
Responsibility and Constitutional Space
We have not yet finished with the innovations of Publius in liberal virtue. In ad-
dition to ambition, an old topic discussed in Aristotle’s Ethics, we find responsibi-
lity, a new term used, perhaps coined, by Publius to describe the correct behavior 
of a representative toward the people.44 The word has caught on to the extent that 
today “fulfill your responsibilities” is the way we say “be virtuous” or “do your 
duty.” This is the most striking example of The Federalist’s influence on our moral 
behavior and vocabulary.
“Responsibility” occurs principally in the discussion of the Senate, written 
by Madison, and of the President, written by Hamilton; but Madison is apparently 
the author of the new definition of the word. Before The Federalist, “responsible” 
meant “responsive” in the sense of responsible to, and Madison introduced the 
idea of responsible for. The House of Representatives, elected every two years, is 
more responsive to the people than is the Senate, yet the Senate, with its six-year 
term, allows a Senator to become responsible for actions that the people might not 
think of on their own or endorse immediately but would approve in a more distant 
election or after things settle down. This relatively long term makes it possible for 
44 See the excellent discussion, to which I am indebted, in: D. F. Eps t e in, The Political Theory of the 
Federalist, Chicago 1984, pp. 179–185. See also: D. Ada i r, Fame and the Founding Fathers, ed. T. Co lbou rn, 
New York 1974, and H. C. Mans f i e ld, Responsibility and Its Perversions, in: Individualism and Social Respon-
sibility, ed. A. Cec i l, Dallas 1994, pp. 79–99.
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the government to sustain the difference between the people’s immediate desires 
and their “deliberate sense,” a distance that might be called constitutional space. In 
general, America has a popular government with constitutional space between the 
people and the government, giving the latter freedom to act on behalf, as distinguis-
hed from at the behest, of the people. A responsible person uses this freedom to act 
on his own – taking the initiative or taking charge – in order to act on behalf of the 
people. The individual actor and the people are linked, and though the actor beco-
mes outstanding in comparison to the rest of the people, even something of a hero, 
he does not look down on the multitude of mere “human beings” as did Achilles.
“Responsibility,” like “energy,” is a morally neutral word because one can be 
the cause of, or responsible for, evil as well as good. In everyday usage, however, 
“responsible” is a term of praise (like “energetic”), and “irresponsible” a term of 
blame. It is linked to interest because it is in one’s interest to be known as respon-
sible, but it also differs from interest. The responsible person takes a risk in acting 
when, perhaps, by not taking charge, he might have let George do it and still get the 
benefits or avoid the blame himself. Responsibility is a virtue that steps in when 
one’s interest is at a loss to decide between gaining a benefit and enduring some 
danger, and may therefore be content to let things happen. It is voluntary, and less 
automatic than interest; and it makes one stand out from the rest rather than follow 
the average or mediocre course recommended by self-interest.
Responsibility is the virtue that makes possible lack of virtue, or self-inte-
rest. It is the grander sense of freedom, the freedom to found and save a free coun-
try, that makes possible the generic sense of freedom which is living as you please. 
Yet it is a democratic virtue, not because everyone will be responsible but because 
anyone can be. It is like a duty in being attached to an office or a role – the respon-
sibility of the president or of a parent – but it differs from duty in being voluntary or 
more voluntary. Sometimes, as with a parent, the risk in responsibility is reduced to 
the burden or inconvenience. Responsibility is the voluntary assumption of a task, 
like changing diapers, that you might not choose for itself. Even in a free country 
someone must change diapers – not a Senator of course, but someone with a virtue 
that encompasses the great and the menial.
To conclude: I have not been discussing the virtue of the majority of Ame-
ricans at the time of the Founding, for that would be more Christian and Protestant 
than what can found in Locke, Montesquieu, Ben Franklin or the authors of The 
Federalist. My intent was to see what is more innovative and at the same time 
more peculiarly American than what most Americans practiced and believed. Part 
of the innovation is in Franklin’s list of virtues for a free, democratic society, in 
which religion is assumed but depreciated. More of the innovation, I would say, 
is in Publius, who is an underrated source of – one cannot say moral inspiration 
– but moral suggestion and definition in America. Publius’ notions of ambition, 
energy, and responsibility had behind them the force of the Constitution, the force 
deriving from the form, which provides constitutional space. What is this force? 
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It is not self-interest generally or theoretically understood, but “the interest of the 
office.” And the interest of the office is a kind of interest that permits and requires 
the cooperation of virtue. The lesson overall is that moral philosophy is incomplete 
without political philosophy.
